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1. On a certification from the USDC S.D. Ohio, the ~~ .....,___ 
U.s. Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals [TECA] held that --~'? 
the Economic Stabilization Act [Act] authorizes the Federal~ ~ - ~ i- y-z._.. 
Pay Board and other administrative machinery created by the~~ - -~ 
Act to control the salaries of employees of the State of Ohio,~~~ 
\., ) '-- despite the passage of a bill by that state's legislatur~ . ~ ? 
;['~!.-MU, Pow~~ i1t& I4<A- J- ~~ 'o-..d ~ 1.A..ple~~J re~~ . 
tA~ '~f4'1•e ~, A, ~~ .kJ tlu ~dt- ~ ~ 
~, ~ Ali.~A. ~ 
t"'\ 
\ cc/ '-------' 
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authorizing a pay raise for the state's employees. The 
petition in this case and that in the related case, Ohio v. 
United States (No. 73-839), challenges Congress' constitutional 
power to control the wages and salaries of state government 
employees. 
2. FACTS: The United States brought suit pursuant to ----the Act in the District Court seeking a permanent in'unction -- ..::..:.._ --to prevent Ohio from violating the Act and the pertinent 
Executive Order by paying salaries in excess of those authorized 
by the Pay Board in its March 10, 1973 order. The facts were 
undisputed. The new Ohio pay bill called for an average pay 
increase of 10.6% for the 65,000 affected public employees. 
In a mandamus proceeding shortly after the law's passage, the 
Ohio courts ordered the Governor to pay the salaries. Acting 
upon an application by the State, the Federal Pay Board denied 
the application for exception (from the 5.5% wage control 
guidelines) to the extent the requested increase was in excess 
of 7% for the current year. 
3. DECISION OF TECA: 
a. TECA first rejected the State's argument that 
Congress did not intend in the Act to authorize control over 
state wage and salary practices. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 
, _____..-;} 
99 (1946) (Congress need not expressly use the word "State" in 
price regulation legislation in order to have intended that States 
be subject to the statutory scheme). While it was true that the 
Act does not explicitly state that it applies to state governments, 
c - 3 -
there is nothing looking the other way. The Act's extensive -
legislative history unequivocally reveals that Congress 
,_ 
intended the salary and wage provisions to apply to state --------- -
and local governments. In fact, Sen.:_tor Proxmire ~ amendment II 
on the floor to exempt them was debated and defeated 56-35. 
------. 
Moreover, the federal agencies charged by the Act with its 
administration have consistently construed it in this manner. 
b. The Act, TECA held, was a legitimate exercise 
of Congress' power to impose economic controls under the 
Commerce Clause. The Tenth Amendment was no obstacle. Murphy 
v. O'Brien, ____ F.2d ____ (TECA Oct. 10, 1973). This case is 
controlled by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), ~here 
the Court upheld application of the Fair Labor Standards Act's 
minimum wage and overtime provisions . to employees of state-
operated hospitals and schools. While Congress lacks the power 
to regulate all state activities under the guise of the 
Commerce Clause, it does have the power to regulate certain 
activities when it has a rational basis to conclude that they 
substantially affect commerce. Congres.s had such a rational 
basis here for imposing temporary economic controls on state 
and local government salaries. Ohio has made no showing that 
they have unreasonably interfered with its ability to function 
as a sovereign state; nor has it demonstrated that the regulations 
are invidiously discriminatory. 
c. The Ohio state court decision is not~ judicata 
simply because the United States was permitted to intervene there. 
,. 
.· 1/r .;;:; 
tv 
- 4 -
Section 211 of the Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the 
federal courts over the constitutionality of the Act and 
the validity of any action taken under the Act. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petrs in No. 73-822 maintain that 
the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from invading the sovereignty 
of a state and directing what wages and sa~aries may be paid 
to state employees. Principal reliance is placed upon the 
dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra. 
Petrs in No. 73-839 argue that Congress has exceeded its powers 
under the Commerce Clause and invaded the province of state 
governments by regulating state government pay practices, which, 
petrs contend, affect the very scope, quality and adequacy of 
the overall operation of the state government. Petrs read 
Maryland v. Wirtz to mean that Congress can only regulate those 
state activities which are or could be performed by private ·-~e. 392 U.S., at 196 n. 27. Under TECA's rationale, 
they see no logical way to stop 'Congress from legislatively 
abolishing the states as effective instruments of government." 
Petn., at 8. They finally argue that Congress had no rational 
basis for determining that the States' activity sought to be 
regulated had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. They 
argue that Congress never actually examined the alleged impact 
that state wages and salaries could have upon inflation. 
The SG points to Maryland v. Wirtz, where the Court put 
to rest the Tenth Amendment argument, and further notes that 





performing a proprietary vs. governmental function. 
"[W]e look to the activities in 
which the states have traditionally 
engaged as marking the boundary of 
the restriction upon the federal 
taxing power. But there is no such 
limitation upon the plenary power to 
regulate commerce. The state can 
no more deny the power if its exercise 
has been authori~ed by Congress than 
can an individual." United States v. 
California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-185. 
In exercising its commerce powers, Congress "may override 
countervailing state interests whether these be described as 
'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character." Maryland v. 
Wirtz, supra, 392 U.S., at 195. The Act here does not regulate 
the substantive performance of state functions. To the extent 
that they function in a capacity as employers, the States, like 
their private counterparts, are restricted in the area o~ wage 
and salary increases. The legislation is certainly rational: 
to be effective in stabilizing the economy and limiting inflation, 
it was imperative that all large employers, both public and 
private, be subject to the regulation. 
5. DISCUSSION: It would seem that the federal government 
wins the argument hands down in view of Maryland v. Wirtz and 
Congress' abundant power under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
wages and salaries. There would appear to be little need for 
the Court to grant cert only to confirm this proposition. 
1/29/74 
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Motion to Dismiss Writ 
of Certiorari 
The Court granted cert to TECA in this case on February 19, 
19 74 in order to review the question of whether the lOth Amcnclr:ncnt bars 
the fede ra1 government from. enforcing against the States, in their capaci ti"--
as employers, gene ra1 regulations of conunerce that affect governn1 ental 
and nongovcrrunenta1 en.J.ploycrs alike. Tbe issue arises in the context of 
t he Economic Stabilization Act '..Vhich Jin1itcd the extent to which Ohio coulc"!. 
increase the sala rics of its public cnlp1oyecs . 
- 2 -
Noting that the /\ct expired on /\pril 30, the SG moves to clismis::-: 
the writ on the ground tbo.t the case no longer has prospective importance. 
The SG advises that the issue is raised in only two other pending actions 
[U.S. v. Mo. (W.D. Mo.) and U.S. v. Calif. (E. D. Cal.)] and that he has -- -- -- ---
been infonned by the Cost of Living Council that no proceedings raising this 
issue are pending before it. Conceding that the issue could arise in the 
future under different statutes, the SG' suggests tha,t the Court should 
reserve consideration of the issue w1.til it arises in the contc t of an operati\-_ 
regulatory s chcme of broad and continuing significance. Tbe SG cites 
Morri s v. Wetnb.~2·ger, 410 U.S. 422; Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 
U.S. 70; and District of Columbia v. Sweeney, 310 U.S. 631, in support of 
his motion. 
DISCUSSION: In Morr1s, the Court, after argument, disn1.issed the 
writ as improvid ently granted. The Court noted that 2 0 days after the '' rit 
had been granted, Congress amended the relevant statutory provisions of 
the Social Security Act there in issue. Ric e concerned a private cemetery! s 
refusal to bury an Indian. Upon rehearing, five members of the Court 
disrni ssed the writ on the ground that, after com.mencernent of the, ction. 
the State enacted a statute prohibiting cemeteries from denying burial on 
account of race. Although the statute was, by its t enns , not applicable to 
pending actions, the Court noted that it made the case one of ''iso1 ated 
significance. 11 In a memo decision in Swecney, the Court denied cert 
"in vie\v of tbc fact that the tax is laic1 111 cr a statute '\vhich has been re-
pealed and the question is therefore not of public irnportance. 11 
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No. 73-822 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: November 8, 1974 
FROM: Penny Clark 
No. 73-822 Fry v. United States 
The issues in this case are whether Congress intended 
to subject state salaries to wage and price controls under 
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 and whether, if it 
did, its action was constitutional. 
The SG argues that the issue of coverage is not 
properly before the Court because it was not raised in the 
petition for certiorari. This is a very mechanical approach, 
since it would be inappropriate to reach the constitutional 
question without first resolving the issue of coverage. The 
SG has briefed the issue, and even though petitioners them-
selves have not addressed it, the TECA decided it, and several 
{i~~lu~'tt.. St:lt~ ~ O~o) 
amici~have briefed it as well. 
The Court has deferred consideration of the SG's motion 
to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 
The SG notes that the Economic Stabilization Act expired 
after cert was granted, and argues that the issue is no longer 
of major importance. [It is not moot, because Ohio has been 
enjoined from paying a total of $10.5 million to its employees. 
There is a suggestion that, if the injunction were dissolved, 
Ohio would pay back wages to its employees.] Petitioner says 
2. 
that the SG is taking an inconsistent position by petitioning 
for cert in an Economic Stabilization Act case that the 
Government lost in California, but the clerk's office tells 
me no such petition has been filed (as of 11/8/74). 
The coverage issue isn't crystal clear, but it does 
seem that Congress intended to include state employees. 
The Act is exceptionally broad, with almost no exceptions, 
and it even leaves the definition of "wages" to the administrative 
process. The only strong argument that state salaries should 
not be included is the doctrine that statutes should not be 
presumed to include sovereigns unless they say so explicitly. -This doctrine has been undermined in several of this Court's 
cases, and like other doctrines of statutory interpretation, 
is resorted to only for ambiguous statutes. The Senate's \ / 
rejection of a floor amendment exempting state employees is / ~ 
a strong indicator of congressional intent and probably J 
makes the presumption unnecessary. 
The constitutional issue is largely governed by Maryland 
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). There the Court reaffirmed 
the doctrine that Congress, acting within a delegated power 
(i.e., the commerce power) may override countervailing state 
interests. The Court rejected the analogy to cases adopting 
the governmentalJ'propietary distinction as a limit on 
Congress's power to tax state activities. The issue is 
simply whether the legislation is an "otherwise valid regulation 
of commerce." Noting that the Court has power to keep 
Congress from destroying the states, the Court held: 
But while the commerce power has limits, valid 
general regulations of commerce do not cease to be 
regulations of commerce because a State is involved. 
If a State is engaging in economic activities that 
are validly regulated by the Fe eraL Government 
when engaged in by private persons, the State too 
may be forced to conform its activities to federal 
regulation. 
3. 
392 U.S. at 196-197. Justices Douglas and Stewart dissented, 
saying that requiring the state to pay minimum wages to its 
hospitals and schools gave the federal government too much 
power over state budgetary policy. They would have applied 
the governmental/proprietary distinction of the tax cases. 
The petitioners argue that control over state wages 
threatens the very existence of state government. They 
vastly overstate their case. When wages in all sectors of 
the economy are under controls, applying the same controls 
to state wages is unlikely to cause a mass exodus from the 
state civil service. While the state has a strong interest/~ 
in setting its own employment policies, a temporary freeze 
on wages is a minor interference. 
I think the rule suggested in Maryland v. Wirtz is a 
good solution to the conflict between the state's interests 
and the federal interests. Taking a narrow view of the quoted 
passage, it suggests that in the absence of special circum-
stances, a state may be included in a regulatory program of -
general applicability. There is little danger that such a ----
4. 
rule would allow Congress to interfere substantially in state 
governance. The special problems of legislation aimed directly 
at the states can be dealt with under other principles, such 
as those prompting the limits on federal power to tax state 
activities. 
The governmental/proprietary distinction is on its way 
out of other areas of law, primarily because a number of state 
two aac.tl~:t 
activities fit neither of the~categoriesA(e.g., transportation, 
hospitals, public utilities). Moreover, it is not especially 
well suited to commerce-clause principles. For example, 
the federal commerce power nullifies certain kinds of state 
taxes on interstate commerce. The taxation power is integral 
to the existence of any state government, but the needs of 
interstate commerce have been deemed to justify federal 
interference. 
Recommendations 
Although the constitutional issue has lost immediate 
importance with the expiration of the Economic Stabilization 
Act, there is still a lot of money involved. Since the case 
can probably be decided under Maryland v. Wirtz, I would 
recommend reaching the merits.tlllllllll ................ . 
On the merits, I would 
first decide the coverage issue in favor of the Government 
and then affirm on a Maryland v. Wirtz rationale. 
5. 
The State of Ohio's petition for cert in this case is 
still pending, No. 73-839. The SG raises a point of time-
liness, arguing that the petition was untimely because it was 
filed under an extension and the statute authorizing 
certiorari from TECA does not provide for extensions. Act 
§ 2ll(g), 85 Stat. 750. I have found no general statute or 
rule that would authorize an extension, so I think the SG 
is right. Since the time is prescribed by statute, the 
tardiness would be jurisdictional. But, since the issues can 
be resolved under this petition, an order denying Ohio's 
' petition will be academic. 
P.C. 
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To : The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice White 
Mr . Justice Blaokmun 
~r. Justice Powell 
~ Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
From : Marshall, J . 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STNNiilated: lrtN 8 1975 
No. 73--822 Reoiroulated: 
Ernest Fry aud Thelma] On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Boehm, Petitioners, Temporary Emergency 
v. Court of Appeals of the 
United States. United States. 
[January -, 1975] 
Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 1 authorized 
the President to issue orders and regulations to stabilize 
wages and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing 
on May 25, 1970. By Executive Order, the President 
created the Pay Board to oversee wage and salary con-
trols imposed m~der the Act's authorization. ~xecutive 
Order 11627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20136. In implementing the 
wage stabilizatiqn program, the Pay Board issJ.Ied regu-
lations that limited annual salary increases for covered 
employees to 5.5cy'o and required prior Board approval 
for all salary adjustments affecting 5,000 or more em-
ployees.2 The State of Ohio subsequently enaqted legis-
lation providing for a 10.6% wage and salary increa~, 
effective January 1, 1972, for almost 65,000 state em-
ployees.3 The State applied to the Pay Eoard for 
1 Pub. L. 91-379, Aug. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, 12 
U. S. C. § 1204 (Supp. I 1G70). The Act was extended five times 
before it expired on April 30, 1974 
2 6 CFR §§201.10; 101.21 ( 1972) See also id., § 101.28. 
3 OhiO Revised Code § 143 102 (A), as amended, § 124.15 (A} 
(1972). The Act provided for ~alary mcrt>ast>s for employees of the 
state government, state umversities, &nd county welfare departments. 
Elected :;iute officials were not included. 
------
73-822-0PINION 
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approval of the increases, and a public hearing was held. 
In Mareh 1972, the Board denied the application for an 
exemption to the extent that it exceeded salary increases 
of 7% for the 1972 wage year.4 Petitioners, two state 
employees, sought a writ of mandamus, in state court to 
compel Ohio officials to pay the full increases provided 
in the state Pay Bill Act. The Ohio Supreme Court 
granted the writ and ordered the increases to be paid. 
Fry v. Ferguson, 34 Ohio St. 2d 252, 298 N. E. 2d 129 
(1973). 
After the State Supreme Court decision, the United 
States filed this action in the District Court to enjoin 
Ohio and its officials from paying wage and salary 
increases in excess of the 7o/r authorized by the Pay 
Board. The District Court certified to the Temporary 
Emergency Court of Appeals the question of the appH-
cability of federal wage and salary controls to state 
employees. See 12 U. S. C. §§ H)04, 211 (c) (1970 
Supp. I). 
The Court of Appeals construed the Act as applying 
to state employees and as such upheld its constitution-
ality. United States v. Ohio, 487 F. 2d 936 (T. E. C. A. 
1973). Relying on the decisions of this Court in Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), and United States v. 
Californ:ia, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), the court concluded that 
the interference with sta.te affairs incident to the uniform 
implementation of federal aconomic controls was of no 
consequence since Congress had a rational basis upon' 
Which to conclude that the state activity substantially 
'1 The. Pay Board determined that the implementation of the pay 
increase from March 1972 to November 1972 would reduce the 
effective ratt· to 7% for the wage year November 14, 1971, to 
November 13, 1972. The payments in issue here therefore represent 
the wages and salanes that. , were due from .January 1, 1972, when 
the pay increa:se was to take effect, to March 16, 1972. The tota!. 
ll,Ulount involved is $10.5nullion. 
73-822-0PINION 
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affected commerce. The Court of Appeals accordingly 
enjoined the payment of wage and salary increases in 
excess of the amount authorized by the Pay Board. We 
affirm. 
I 
At the outset, it is contended that Congress did not 
intend to include state employees within the reach of 
the Economic Stabilization Act and that the Pay Board 
therefore did not have the authority to regulate the com-
pensation due state employees.~ We disagree. The lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act leave no doubt 
that Congress intended that it apply to employees 
throughout the economy, including those employed by 
state and local governments. The Act contemplated 
general stabilization of "prices, rents, wages, salaries, 
dividends, and interest," 12 U. S. C. §§ 1904, 202, and 
it provided that the controls should "call for generally 
comparable sacrifices by business and labor as well as 
other segments of the economy." I d., ~ 203 (b) ( 5). It 
contained no exceptions for employees of any govern-
mental bodies, even at the federal leveJ.6 The failure 
5 Petitioners did not ra1se the ~tatutory ~~~ue either in their peb-
tlon for certioran or in their bnrf. Rather than drcide a constitu-
tional question when there may be doubt whether there is any statu-
tory basis for it, howrver, W(' deal first w1th thr t>tatutory question, 
wh1ch is addressed in the bnefs of amici curiae serking reversal. 
6 Congress did provide for thr exemption of certain categories of 
employees, such as member:; of the workmg poor, those earning sub-
standard wages, and those entitled to wagr incrrases under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. 12 (T. S C.§ 1904, §§ 20:3 (d), (f) (Supp. I, 
1970) See al~o td., §§2Ga (c)(l)-(3) (f)(2)(3), and (g). The 
var10us stabilization agenciC'l:! have uniformly interpreted the Act to 
include thr States w1thin 1ts scope, ~ee 36 Fed. Reg. 21790, td., at 
25420; :37 Fed Rt>g. 1240; uf., at 24961; id., at 24989-24991 We 
have long rrcognized that the mterpretation of a statute by an 
implmwntmg agency i::; entitled to great weight Udall v. Tallman. 
aso F. s. "1, lo-u~ (1965), 
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of the Act to make express reference to the States does 
not warrant the inference that controls may not be 
extended to their employees. See Case v. Bowles, 327 
U.S. 92, 99 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S., 
at 186. Indeed, in framing the Act, Congress specifically 
rejected an amendment that would have exempted em-
ployees of state and local governments. 117 Cong. Rec. 
43673-43677. And the Senate Committee Report makes 
it plain that the Committee considered and rejected a 
proposed exemption for the same group. S. Rep. No. 
92-507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1971). It is clear, then, 
that Congress intended to reach state and local govern-
mental employees. The only' remaining question is 
whether it could do so consistent with the constitutional 
Umitations on its power. 
II 
Petitioners acknowledge that Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause is very broad. Even activity that 
is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by 
Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct 
by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the 
States or with foreign nations. See Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United State.<;, 379 U. S. 241, 255 (1964); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128 (1942). 
There is little difficulty m concluding that such an effect 
could well result from large wage increases to 65,000 
employees in Ohio and similar numbers in other States. 
' PeWiciflers do not appear to challenge Congress' con-
clusion that unrestrained wage increases, even for em-
ployees of wholly intrastate operations, could have a. 
Significant effect on commerce. Instead, they contend 
that applying the Economic Stabilization Act to state 
employees interferes with sovereign state functions and 
for that reason the Commerce Clause should not be read 
,. 
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to permit regulation of all state and local governmental 
employees.7 
On the facts of this case, this argument is foreclosed 
by our decision in Jl1aryland v. Wirtz, supra, where we 
held that the Fair Labor Standards Act could constitu-
tionally be applied to schools and hospitals run by a 
State. Wirtz reiterated the principle that States are not 
immune from all federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause merely because of their sovereign status. 392 
U. S., at 196-197. We noted, moreover, that the statu-
tory regulation in Wirtz was quite limited in character. 
The "interference" with sovereign sta.te functions went 
only so far as to provide that when a State employs 
people to perform functions normally covered by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, "it is subject to the same 
restrictions as a wide range pf other employers whose 
activities affect commerce, including privately operated 
I!!Chools and hospitals." !d., at 194. In this case, the 
interference with state sovereignty is similarly limitecfin 
nature. The wage restrictions were not directed particu .. 
larly at the States, but included the States in a plenary 
scheme, the comprehensiveness of which was judged 
essential to its success. Nor did the regulation affect 
the manner in which state officials could perform their 
7 Petitioners have st11ted their argument not in terms of the Com~ 
merce power, but in terms of the limitations on that power imposed 
by the Tenth Amendment. While the Tenth Amendment has been 
characterizt>d as a "truism," stating merely that "all is retained 
which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U. S, 
100, 124 (1941), it is not without significanct>. The Amendment 
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not 
t>xercise power in a fashion t.hat impairs the States' integrity or their 
ability to function effectively in a federal system. Despite the 
extravagant claims on thiS Bcore made by some amici, we are con-
vinced that the wage re:;triction regulations constitutf'd no such 
drastic invasion of fltate sovereignty, 
.1\i:• 
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duties. As in Wirtz, the federal regulations merely 
limited jhe wages and salaries paid to state employees: 
it did-not purport to,.(impose substantive restrictions on 
the functions the States could perform or otherwise to 
affect the way state employees carry out their work. 
Petitioners seek to distinguish Maryland v. Wirtz on 
the ground that the employees in that case pefformed 
primarily "proprietary" functions, while those subject 
to the wage regulations in this case performed both "pro-
prietary" and "governmental" functions. But this Court 
rejected a similar attempted distinction as early as ? 
United States v. California, 297 U. S., at 183, where the 
Federal Safety Appliance Act was held applicable to an 
intrastate railroad owned by the State of California. 
Indeed, we reiterated the same view in Wirtz its~lf. See 
392 U. S., at 195. 
We conclude that the Economic Stabilization Act was 
constitutional as applied to state and local governmental 
employees. Since the Ohio wage legislation conflicted 
with the Pay Board's ruling, under the Supremacy Clause 
the State must yield to the federal mandate. See Public 
Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 542-
545 (1958); Murphy v. O'Brien, 485 F. 2d 671, 675 
(T. E . C. A. 1973). 
Affirmed. 
;iu:prmtt <!fcu:rt cf tlrt ~tb .:§tatts 
~asfting~ !9. <!f. 2Ll,?'l-.;l 
CHAMI!IERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
January 6, 1975 
Re: No. 73-822 - Fry v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u:prtntt Qfonrl ltf tlrt ~b ;§fa!tg 
'J!frur fringhm, ~. aJ. 20~J!. ~ 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
January 6, 1975 
Re: No. 73-822, Fry v. United States 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
.;o>:U:Jn-.nnt!" \!j-V;u:n u~ n!+(!tnn:u·u .;::vm:u~ 
~a:~drht!lfou:. ~. <!f. 2o~JI.~ j 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
January 9, 1975 
Dear Thurgood: 
Re: No. 73-822 - Fry, et al. v. United States 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,~ • 
l[!,. 




No. 73-822 United 
Dear Thurgood: 
. As I mentioned at Friday's 
from joining you in En because 
on National League o~ities v. 
Brennan. 
Conference, I have refrained 
of concern as to its effect 
Brennan and california v. 
'jt·' 
There were at least five, perhaps six of us, Who 
indicated that we will vote to note these cases. I have 
reread your circulation in ~, and it seems to me that in 
its present form ~ would mike it difficult for us to 
consider National~ague of Cities with genuine freedom to 
decide it on its own merits. PUtting it differently, !II. 
(as now written) will strengthen the force of Wirtz as a 
precedent and possibly be viewed as extending Wirtz. 
In my view, EEl: need not constitute an extention or 
even an endorsement of lvirtz. The Economic Stabilization 
Act was addressed to a national emergency regarded by 
everyone as being temporary in character. No one supposed !' 
that the wage and price freeze was permanent legislation 
comparable to the Fair Labor Standards Act. As you point 
,· ·li>., out in your opinion, the freeze applied as an emergency 
measure across the board to all wages and salaries both 
public and private. It was an extraordinary exercise of 
commerce clause power, designed to meet an emergency. I 
would gladly join an opinion focused primarily on this ' 
.h. i. 
aspect of the case. 
' ' 
On page 5 of your draft in En you point out, quite 
aorrectly, that Wirtz was "limitiClin character'-: and that 
it applied only to state employees who "performed functions 
normally covered by the Fair T .. abor Standards Act," namely, 
. ' ' 
... 
- 2 -
employees in privately operated schools and hospitals. 
leaves open the possibility of distinguishing Wirtz in 
" National League of Cities. 
· ln the last paragraph in your draft (p. 6), you conclude, 
that there is no merit to the distinction between "proprietary" 
and "governmental" functions so far as the Fair Labor Standards 
Act is concerned. It is true that \virtz so indicated in a 
dictum. But I am unwilling to go so far, at least until we ;,,. 
have considered oral arguments and briefs in National League 
of Cities v. Brennan. , 
In summary, if you are disposed to write ~ someWhat 
more narrowly, emphasizing the national emergency and its 
temporary nature, and eliminating or modifying the next to 
the last paragraph with respect to proprietary functions, 
I will happily join you now. Otherwise, I suggest we hold 
f!Y. for National League of Cities. 
If ~ comes down in its present form, I am afraid the 
the Court Will have gone a long way to pre-judge National 
League of Cities. 
Sincerely, 
.:§u.vrtmt <!Jnurt nf t4t ~tb .:§ta:Us 
~a:sJri:ngton. Ill· <!J. 21lc?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 14, 1975 
Re: No. 73-822 -Fry v. United States · 
Dear Thurgood: 
I am substantially in accord 
expressed to you in his letter of 
offer you the same assurance that 
your part, would procure my vote, 
in its present form and if no one 
or concurrence, I probably will. 
few days and let you know. 
.• 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
with the sentiments Lewis 
January 14th~ I cannot 
a narrower rendition, on 
but I can't join the opinion 
else writs:; either a dissent 
I will decide in the next 
Sincerely/ 
~ttprttttt <!}ourl of tqt ~ttift~ _:$~g 
~M!rhtgttttt. ~. Qf. 2ll,?J!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
January 15, 1975 
Re: No. 73-822 - Fry v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
I have already joined your opinion in this case 
and you have a court. There is much to be said, however, 
for Lewis' point of view 1 set forth in his letter to you of 
January 14. This note is just to state that it is all right 
with me if you wish to accommodate him. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
,jttFttttt <!}cud cf tqt ~b ~taftg 
'DhttlJrhtghttt. ~. <!}. 21T&f"'~ 
January 16, 197 5 
No. 73-822 -- Fry v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
/ 
I have read and reread your note concerning this case. I have 
considered your suggestions along with a rereading of my opinion 
and regret that I cannot agree with you. 
Fry was carefully cut to the bone and about as narrow a holding 
as I can imagine. That was true before National League of Cities 
came along, and, I submit is true now. 
You are correct about one dECision affecting a later case. Since 
both sides of the case heard on Tuesday cited our opinion in the 
I. T. T. case handed down an hour or so before, maybe we should 
have held up the I. T. T. opinion. 
More than that, I fear if we follow your suggestions we will be 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~tt.prtmt <!Jottrlllf tqt ~tb ~taftg 
j)rrurlying~ ~. <!J. 2llc?>l$ 
January 17, 1975 
Re: Fry v. United States - No. 73-822 
Dear Thurgood: 
I will circulate a dissent in this case. I am 
sorry to have taken so long to fish or cut bait, and 
will do my best to get it out during the week after 
next. 





~ttttt <!fond of t~t 1Jtttitt~ .;§farni 
._asfrington, lfl. <!J. 20.?11-~ / 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS February 11, 1975 
Dear Thurgood: 
Re: Fry v. United States, No. 73-822. 
Please add at the end of your opinion in Fry v. Unites States 
the following statement. 
Less than three months after we granted certiorari, Congress 
allowed the Economic Stabilization Act to expire on April 30, 
1974 . There is therefore no continuing impediment to the 
payment of salary increases of the kind at issue in this case. 
I would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
' ' 
a;t/ c; . M ~ 
&u-~le} ~J c1 
/)c , /'0~ 
Mr. 
i.r. 
,Tuct .ce 3cennan 
J' J,.:> ~~:. c o Stewart 
Mr. Juct~ca f~ite 
Mr. Jvctiuo Mar~hall 
Mr. .:!'ustie ~ Bh.ckmun 
Mr . Ju~tice Rehnquist 
~ ~ ~ _;~-- ~~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFE 
No. 73-822 
Ernest Fry and Thelmal9n Writ of Certiorari to the 
. Boehm, Petitioners, Temporary Emergency Court 
v. of Appeals of the United 
United States. . States. 
[March -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I am persuaded that principles of federalism impose 
some limits on direct congressional regulation of state 
government, but I do not think they have been exceeded in 
this case. In 1970 Congress enacted the Economic Stabi-
lization Act as an emergency measure to counter severe 
infh.tion that threatened the national economy. H. R. 
Rep. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-11 (1970). 
The method it chose, under the Commerce Clause, was 
to give the President authority to freeze virtually all 
wages and prices, including the wages of state and local 
government employees. In 1971, when the freeze was 
activated, state and local government employees com-· 
posed 147c of the Nation's work force. Brief for the 
United States, at 20. It seems inescapable that the 
effectiveness of federal action would have been drastically 
i.mpaired if wage increaseo to this sizeable group of 
employees were left outside the reach of these emergency 
federal wage controls. 
Although the Issue is not free from doubt, I am willing· 
to sustaiu the action of Congress under the circumstances; 
Qi this. case, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~ttmt <!fonri ttf tfrt ~nitt~ .ihttts 
-Mfringbm. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t.){..;l 
March 20, 1975 
Re: No. 73-822 - Fry v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your separate concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~u:p-unu <!Jttttrt ttf tqt ~trlft~ ,ilatts 
.. MJrittgtlltt, ~. Qf. 2ll,?'l.;l 
March 20, 1975 
Re: No. 73-822 - Fry v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
I expressed to you some time ago my discomfort 
with the implications of the opinion, and in my note of 
January 15 I indicated my sympathy with Lewis 1 point of 
view as set forth in his letter of the preceding day. 
I have now determined that my views coincide 
with those of Lewis. I am therefore joining his separate 
concurrence and am withdrawing my joinder in your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
·.~ 
To: The Chie~u~;~ 
Mr. Just ~as 
Mr. Just ce Brennan 
Kr. Justice Stewart 
Kr. Justice White 
Kr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
~ Kr. Justioe Rehnquist 
From: Marshall, J. 
Circulated: -------
Recirculated: MAR 2 7 1975 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 73-822 
Ernest Fry and Thelma) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Boehm, Petitioners, Temporary Emergency 
v. Court of Appea.Is of the 
United States. United States. 
[January -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the judgment of the 
Court. 
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 1 authorized 
the President to issue orders and regulations to stabilize 
wages and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing 
on May 25, 1970. By Executive Order, the President 
created the Pay Board to oversee wage and salary con-
trols imposed under the Act's authorization. Executive 
Order 11627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20136. In implementing the 
wage stabilization program, the Pay Board issued regu-
lations that limited annual salary increases for covered 
employees to 5.5% and required prior Board approval 
for all salary adjustments affecting 5,000 or more em-
ployees.2 The Stat-a of Ohio subsequently enacted legis-
lation providing for a 10.6% wage and salary increase, ~ ~ 
effective January 1, 1972, for almost 65,000 state em-  ~
ployees.3 The State applied to t'ne Pay Board for ?L ~ 
1 Pub. L. 91-379, Aug. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, note ' ~ ~ 
following 12 U.S. C.§ 1904 (1970 ed Supp. I). The Act was ex- &w.J-- 1~ /rl~ . 
tended five times before 1t cxpmd on April 30, 1974. _. ,_, 
2 6 CFR §§ 201.10, 101.21 (1972) . See also id., § 101.28. ~ 
1 
9-~ 
8 Ohio Revised Code § 143.102 (A), as amended, § 124.15 (A) • •. _-..J I 
(1972) . The Act provided for salary increases for employees of the ~ ~ a_ 
state government, state umverslties, and county welfare departments. (/f)__ ~J J"'!..i~.i~--~ . _ ... 
Elected state official!! were not included, "'-y- .......---r--....c.c 
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approval of the increases, and a public hearing was held. 
In March 1972, the Board denied the application for an 
exemption to the extent that it exceeded salary increases 
of 7% for the 1972 wage year.4 Petitioners, two state 
employees, sought a writ of mandamus in state court to 
compel Ohio officials to pay the full increases provided 
in the state Pay Bill Act. The Ohio Supreme Court 
granted the writ and ordered the increases to be paid. 
Fry v. Ferguson, 34 Ohio St. 2d 252, 298 N. E. 2d 129 
(1973). 
After the State Supreme Court decision, the United 
States filed this action in the District Court to enjoin 
Ohio and its officials from paying wage and salary 
increases in excess of the 7% authorized by the Pay 
Board. The District Court certified to the Temporary 
Emergency Court of Appeals the question of the appli-
cability of federal wage and salary controls to state 
employees. See ~ 211 (c) of the Economic Stabilization \ 
Act, note following 12 U. S. C.~ 1904 (1970 ed. Supp. I). 
The Court of Appeals construed the Act as applying 
to state employees and as such upheld its constitution-
ality. United States v. Ohio, 487 F. 2d 936 (T. E. C. A. 
1973). Relying on the decisions of this Court in Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), and United States v, 
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), the court concluded that 
the interference with state affairs incident to the uniform 
implementation of federal economic controls was of no 
consequence since Congress had a rational basis upon 
which to conclude that the state activity substantially 
' The Pay Board determined that the implementation of the pay 
increase from March 1972 to November 1972 would reduce the 
effective rate to 7% for the wage year November 14, 1971, to 
November 13, 1972. The payments in issue here therefore represent 
the wages and salaries that were due from January 1, 1972, when 
the pay increase was to take effect, to March ~6, 1972. Th, tot_a.) 
amo~mt involved is $10.5 milliou. 
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affected commerce. The Court of Appeals accordingly 
enjoined the payment of wage and salary increases in 
excess of the amount authorized by the Pay Board. We 
affirm. 
I 
At the outset, it is contended that Congress did not 
intend to include state employees within the reach of 
the Economic Stabilization Act and that the Pay Board 
therefore did not have the authority to regulate the com-
pensation due state employees.~ We disagree. The lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act leave no doubt 
that Congress intended that it apply to employees 
throughout the economy, including those employed by 
state and local governments. The Act contemplated 
general stabilization of "prices, rents, wages, salaries, \ 
dividends, and interest," § 202, note following 12 U. S. C. 
§ 1904, and it provided that the controls should "call for 
generally comparable sacrifices by business and labor as 
well as other segments of the economy." Id., at § 203 
(b)(5). It contained no exceptions for employees of any 
governmental bodies, even at the federal level.6 The 
15 Petitioners did not raise the statutory issue either in their peti-
tion for certiorari or in their brief. Rather than decide a constitu-
tional question when there may be doubt whether there is any statu-
tory ba~is for it, however, we deal first with the statutory question, 
which is addressed in the briefs of amici curiae seeking reversal. 
6 Congress did provide for the exemption of certain categories of 
employees, such as members of the working poor, those earning sub-
standard wages, and those entitled to wage increases under the Fair \ 
Labor Standards Act . §§203 (d), (f). See also §§203 (c)(l)-(3), 
(f) (2) (3), and (g) . The various stabilization agencies have uniformly 
interpreted the Act to include the States w1thin its scope, ~:;ee 36 Fed. 
Reg. 21790; td .. at 25420; 37 Fed. Reg. 1240 ; id., at 24961; id., at 
24989-24991. We have long recognized that the interpretation of a 
statute by an unplrmenting agrncy i~:; entitled to great weight. 
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965). 
. , 
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failure of the Act to make express reference to the States 
does not warrant the inference that controls may not be 
extended to their employees. See CfU3e v. Bowles, 327 
U.S. 92, 99 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S., 
at 186. Indeed, in framing the Act, Congress specifically 
rejected an amendment that would have exempted em-
ployees of state and local governments. 117 Cong. Rec. 
43673-43677. And the Senate Committee Report makes 
it plain that the Committee considered and rejected a 
proposed exemption for the same group. S. Rep. No. 
92-507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1971). It is clear, then, 
that Congress intended to reach state and local overn-
menta J?!Oyees. e on y remaining question is 
whether it could do so consistent with the constitutional 
limitations on its power. 
II 
Petitioners acknowledge that Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause is very broad. Even activity that 
is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by 
Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct 
by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the· 
States or with foreign nations. See Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 255 (1964); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127- 128 (1942). 
There is little difficulty in concluding that such an effect l 
could well result from large wage increases to 65,000' 
employees in Ohio and similar numbers in other States, 
e. g., general raises to state employees could inject mil-
lions of dollars of purchasing power into the economy 
and might exert pressure on other segments of the work 
force to demand comparable increases. 
Petitioners do not appear to challenge Congress' con-
clusion that unrestrained wage increases, even for em-
ployees of wholly intrastate operations, could have a 
significant effect on commerce. Instead, they contend 
73-822-0PINION 
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that applying the Economic Stabilization Act to state 
employees interferes with sovereign state functions and 
for that reason the Commerce Clause should not be read 
to permit regulation of all state and local governmental 
employees.7 
On the facts of this case, this argument is foreclosed l 
by our decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, where we 
held that the Fair Labor Standards Act could constitu-
tionally be applied to schools and hospitals run by a 
State. Wirtz reiterated the principle that States are not 
immune from all federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause merely because of their sovereign status. 392 
U. S., at 196-197. We noted, moreover, that the statute 
at issue in Wirtz was quite limited in-application. 
The federal regulation in this case is even less intru-
sive. Congress enacted the Economic Stabilization 
Act as an emergency measure to counter severe in-
flation a t reatened t e na ional economy. H. R. 
Rep. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-11 (1970). 
The method it chose, under the Commerce Clause, was 
to give the President authority to freeze virtually all 
wages and prices, including the wages of state and local 
government employees. In 1971, when the freeze was 
activated, state and local government employees com~ 
posed 14% of the Nation's work force. Brief for the 
1 Petitioners have stated theit argument not in terms of the Com-
merce power, but in terms of the limitations on that power imposed 
by the Tenth Amendment. While the Tenth Amendment has been 
characterized as a "truism," stating merely that "all is retained 
which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 
100, 124 (1941), it is not w1thout significance. The Amendment 
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not 
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their 
ability to function effectively m a federal system. Despite the 
extravagant claims on this score made by some amici, we are con-
vinced that the wage restriction regulations constituted no &lildh 
drAStic invASion of state sovereignty. 
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United States, at 20. It seems inescapable that the ( 
effectiveness of federal action would have been drastically 
impaired if wage increasef> to this sizeable group of 
employees were left outside the reach of these emergency 
federal wage controls. 
We conclude that the Economic Stabilization Act was 
constitutional as applied to state and local governmental 
employees. Since the Ohio wage legislation conflicted 
with the Pay Board's ruling, under the Supremacy Clause 
'the State must yield to the federal mandate. See Public 
Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 542-
545 (1958); Murphy v. O'Brien, 485 F. 2d 671, 675 
(T. E . C. A. 1973). 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS. 
Less than three months after we granted certiorari, 
Congress allowed the Economic Stabilization Act to ex-
pire on April 30, 1974. There is therefore no continuing 
impediment to the payment of salary increases of the 
kind at issue in this case. I would therefore dismiss the 
writ as improvidently granted. 
~u.vumt <!fourl of tltt ~~ j;ta:teg 
1Jaafrhtgtlltt, ~. <!J. 2ll,;t'!~ 
C HAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
March 27, 1975 
PERSONAL 
Re: 73-822 - Fry v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
I can join your limited concurrence 
in the above if you can see your way to insert 
the words ''temporary emergency" after 
"President" on the 9th line of you·r opinion. 
The powers were both temporary and 
emergency, and I think it crucial to hit 
this aspect "hard" to avoid implications as 
to our next case in this area. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~ttpTtltU <!Jourl of tq.t ~ttif.tb j)'mitg 
'Jta:glritt-gfmt.18. <!J. 2ll.?J!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
April 7, 19 7 5 
Re: No. 7 3 - 8 2 2 - F ry v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
If you will permit me, I am glad to join your re-
circulation of March 27. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
j 
I ' 
April 8, 1975 
No. 73~822 Fry v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
In view of the changes made in your circulation of 
March 27, I am happy to withdraw my concurring opinion and 
join you. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
lfp/aa 
cc: Tbe Conference 
~_:1 
Dear Chief: 'h 
As Thurgood substantially incorporated my concurrence 
in his opinion, and omitted the most objectionable language 
from,bis prio,!, drafts, I am joining hia. "", .,_, ,.:' ,, ~~. 
\ \ 
Perhaps he will uke the change suggested in your 'iJ 
letter to me of March 27, if you request it, although I 
really do not think this is necessary ' 
CHAM6ERS OF" 
THE CH I EF JUSTICE 
\..;,.../ .._, 
.:§ttpTtntt <!Jottrlllf tqt ~~ .;§taftg 
~ufring-htt4 ~. <!J. 21l.?'l>;J 
May 23, 1975 
Re: 7 3 -822 - Fry v. U. S. 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
:~ 
~ 
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